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Abstract
We have analyzed the impact of agents and their trading strategies on an
experimental electronic market. Therefore, we added an XML-interface to
an existing electronic market and implemented artificial agents which acted
as elements of disturbance in the trading process. These artificial traders
applied simple and constant strategies which may sometimes appear to be
„rational“ or random to the eyes of other traders. We then stepped back and
recorded the reaction of the electronic market.
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21. Introduction
As electronic media and computer networks  made their appearance in the world of finance,
traders began to use software programs that could help them exploit the possibility of market
gains that are generally forgone by humans. This is either due to the rapidity with which the
transaction must be executed or to the great amount of data that has to be processed in order
to perform these transactions. Such software programs - also known as „agents“ - are being
utilized for different transactions and, consequently, differ greatly in complexity, ranging
from the very simplest to complicated programs which require statistical analysis.
One of the possible future applications of agents is the field of electronic commerce. In this
particular context a commercial interaction is composed of at least three distinct steps. First,
there is a “searching moment” in which buyers and sellers look and find one another; then the
two parties negotiate the terms of exchange; finally there is a settlement and the exchange of
the good (Guttmann et al. 1998, Wurman et al. 1998). Aim of this paper is to study the
negotiation procedure of artificial agents acting on electronic markets that incorporate a
centralized auctioneer process. Although our investigation seems to be more suited for
business-to-business electronic commerce, where a “variable-price model” is well established,
it may be also applied to the consumer side: in fact there are strong signals in this context -
such as online auctions - that the “fixed-price model” may not be the only possible scenario in
retail electronic commerce.
To be more specific, the paper analyzes the impact of agents and their trading strategies on an
experimental electronic market. For this purpose, we added an XML-interface to an existing
electronic market and introduced artificial agents which act as elements of disturbance in the
trading process. These artificial traders apply simple and constant strategies which may
sometimes appear „rational“ or random to the eyes of other traders. We then stepped back and
recorded the reaction of the electronic market.
The research emphasis lies not in finding the agent which applies the best strategy: other
papers have dealt with this problem in much greater detail (Rust et al. 1993). Rather the
emphasis lies with the “market” and with questions such as: “How does the market react to
agents?” Far from being obvious, this question is far more complicated than intuition would
prompt to think. There has been a discussion on the lower bound of traders’ intelligence to act
similarly to human traders in a market institution. Gode and Sunder (1993), for example,
introduce “zero-intelligence” traders that act randomly and, nevertheless, converge to the
theoretical equilibrium price within a continuous double auction (CDA) framework,
suggesting that price is determined more by market structure rather than by the intelligence of
the traders. On the other hand, Cliff and Bruten (1998) present criticism to this point of view,
arguing that these results are an artifact of the experimental regime chosen by Gode and
Sunder and introduce “zero-intelligence plus” traders, which seem to have some more
“intelligence” by employing a modified adaptive version of the random agent.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next Section we discuss the technical
implementation of the market-agent interface. Section 3 gives an overview on the set of the
implemented trading strategies. Next comes the presentation of the results of the experiment
in Section 4. We then defer a discussion of related work to Section 5 in order to be able to
better place our work in the context of related efforts. Open research questions for further
exploration and concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
32. Market-agent interface
In this Section we first present a short description of the electronic market, whereas the
market itself is regarded as a black box. We then focus on the information available to the
agents and on the communication between agents and the market.
2.1 Market rules
Our market is an artificial stock market infrastructure that has been used for several sports and
election markets.1 So far, human traders invest their own funds and buy/sell shares, based on
their prediction about the outcome of some kind of event. The experiments that have been run
with human trader are in the tradition of experimental economics (Smith 1976) in that
participants are paid according to their results. The design of the market follows closely the
Iowa Electronic Markets, who have pioneered election markets (Forsythe et al. 1992).
This kind of electronic market is always open, i.e. the traders may trade anytime, at any hour,
and they are always accessible from anyplace in the world which is connected to the Internet.
Traders have an account at the bank and can act on the market by buying and selling assets.
The market is a centralized information hub in which all the transactions are explicitly
regulated via predefined and fixed rules and the agents interact via the market system. In the
following the market rules are explained in brief.
The artificial stock market uses the continuous double auction (CDA), i.e. an auction in which
sellers and buyers may submit bids and asks simultaneously and asynchronously: sellers and
buyers are free to accept bids or asks at any time. The CDA is very popular among financial
markets, both real and virtual, and is thought to have the remarkable quality of being fast and
efficient (Friedman 1984, 1993). In contrast to markets where the emission of shares is
organized by an initial public offering, the emission of shares on this market is implemented
via a so called bundle mechanism. The bundle consists of a standardized portfolio of one
piece of each share at a fixed price: this can be bought from or sold to the bank at any time
and any quantity. The market foresees three valid operations: (1) posting market orders (bids
implement buy orders and asks sell orders), (2) deleting own market orders, and (3)
buying/selling bundles at the bank.
The market actually implements an American futures market, where shares can be traded on
some kind of event. The outcome of the event determines, depending on the market rules, the
payoff of the different shares. For the experiment in Section 4 we have used a winner takes it
all (WTA) payoff scheme, where at the end of the market one share pays off the price of a
bundle, and all other shares pay off zero. Compared to vote share payoffs, where each share
pays off a fixed percentage of the total bundle, WTA markets are considered a risky
environment: when the agent does not have the winning share in his portfolio, he will loose all
his invested money. We used a WTA market for the experiment, because they have the nice
property, that share prices relate directly to the probability of a share paying off, and human
trader often prefer them over vote share markets.
2.2 Information
In order to apply a strategy the agents require information about the market. One of the design
goals of the market-agent interface was to give the same information to human and to
artificial agents. For this purpose we analyzed the information available to human traders and
categorized the information into the following macro-categories:
                                                
1Soccer world championships 1998, http://wm.wiwi.hu-berlin.de, State elections Berlin 1999,
http://www.wahlboerse-berlin.de, European soccer championships 2000, http://www.ribaldo7.de.
4(1) rule information
· basic bundle composition
· bundle price (bought/sold to the bank)
· payoff rules at the end of the market
· start and stop time of the market
(2) public market information
· last traded price of each share
· current bids and asks of each share
· order book: the top 5 bids and asks including prices and quantities of each share
· server time
(3) personal information
· portfolio of the trader
· type of shares
· quantity of shares
· liquid money
(4) transaction status information
· validity of transaction
· success of transaction
Out of the above categories we designed the framework for the market-agent interface. The
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) was chosen as high level data exchange format. Two
Document Type Definitions (DTD) incorporating the above information categories were
developed: the first consists of rule, market, and personal information; the second returns the
result status when an agent is performing one of the three legal market transactions (Fig. 1).
DTD 1:
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='us-ascii'?>
<!--    DTD for agent-experiments on electronic markets -->
<!ELEMENT MARKET (PUBLIC,PRIVATE?)>
<!ELEMENT PUBLIC (MARKETID, BUNDLEPRICE, NO_OF_STOCKS, DIGITS, OPENINGHOURS,
STOCK+)>
<!ELEMENT MARKETID (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT BUNDLEPRICE (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT NO_OF_STOCKS (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT DIGITS (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT OPENINGHOURS (BEGIN, END, NOW)>
<!ELEMENT STOCK (ID, LASTPRICE, OFFER*)>
<!ELEMENT OFFER (BID*, ASK*)>
<!ELEMENT BID (PRICE, QUANTITY)>
<!ELEMENT PRICE (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT QUANTITY (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT ASK (PRICE, QUANTITY)>
<!ELEMENT PRIVATE (USERNAME, BALANCE, AVAILABLE, STOCK+)>
<!ELEMENT PRIVATE.USERNAME (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT PRIVATE.BALANCE (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT PRIVATE.AVAILABLE (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT PRIVATE.STOCK (ID, PORTFOLIO, OFFER*)>
<!ELEMENT PRIVATE.ID (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT PRIVATE.PORTFOLIO (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT PRIVATE.OFFER (BID*, ASK*)>
<!ELEMENT PRIVATE.BID (PRICE, QUANTITY, EXPIRATION_TIME, CREATION_TIME)>
<!ELEMENT PRIVATE.PRICE (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT PRIVATE.QUANTITY (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT PRIVATE.EXPIRATION_TIME (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT PRIVATE.CREATION_TIME (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT PRIVATE.ASK (PRICE, QUANTITY, EXPIRATION_TIME, CREATION_TIME)>
5DTD 2:
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='us-ascii'?>
<!--    DTD for agent-experiments on electronic markets,
        result codes of transactions -->
<!ELEMENT RESULT (CODE,MESSAGETEXT)>
<!ELEMENT CODE (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT MESSAGETEXT (#PCDATA)>
Figure 1: XML DTD‘s for the market-agent interface.
2.3  Agent-Market Communication
The implemented communication between the agent and the market may be broken down into
several steps (Figure 2): (1) the agent makes a request to the electronic market via HTTP, (2)
the electronic market replies by supplying the relevant market information as an XML
document, (3) the agent applies its strategy to the data and decides whether it should perform
one of the three legal actions (see Subsection 2.1) or do nothing, (4) the agent sends the
information regarding its decision to the electronic market via HTTP and (5) receives an
XML document with the status of the transaction.
Agent
(client)
Market
(server)
T
im
e
Request information (1): HTTP request
Market information (2): XML document
Applies its
strategy to
the data (3)
Send decision data (4): HTTP request
Result code (5): XML document
Figure 2: Time sequence diagram: communication between agent and market
In the following, the communication steps are described in more detail. Hereby we also
present the URLs for the complete set of available transactions and the resulting XML-files.
The data exchange between the agents and the market happens, as said before, via the
Internet. Low level exchange protocols are therefore the TCP and IP protocols and the high
level data exchange format is the HTTP protocol.
In step (1) the agent performs a HTTP-request to obtain private and public information:
http://market.wiwi.hu-
berlin.de:7000/xml/market.xml?username=myusername&password=mypassword
The market responds in step (2) with a resulting XML-file (Figure 3). Note that private
information is only supplied when a valid username/password combination is used. Without
valid identification the XML-file will only contain rule and public market information.
6<?xml version="1.0"?>
<MARKET>
<PUBLIC>
<MARKETID>0</MARKETID>
<BUNDLEPRICE>1000</BUNDLEPRICE>
<NO_OF_STOCKS>16</NO_OF_STOCKS>
<DIGITS>0</DIGITS>
<OPENINGHOURS>
<BEGIN>960188969</BEGIN>
<END>982569800</END>
<NOW>962645225</NOW>
</OPENINGHOURS>
<STOCK>
<ID>0</ID>
<LASTPRICE></LASTPRICE>
<OFFER>
<BID>
<PRICE>100</PRICE>
<QUANTITY>1</QUANTITY>
</BID>
<ASK>
<PRICE>500</PRICE>
<QUANTITY>10</QUANTITY>
</ASK> [...code follows...]
</OFFER>
</STOCK>
<STOCK>
<ID>1</ID> [...code follows...]
</STOCK>
</PUBLIC>
<PRIVATE>
<PRIVATE.USERNAME>jensg</PRIVATE.USERNAME>
<PRIVATE.BALANCE>495000</PRIVATE.BALANCE>
<PRIVATE.AVAILABLE>410000</PRIVATE.AVAILABLE>
<PRIVATE.STOCK>
<PRIVATE.ID>0</PRIVATE.ID>
<PRIVATE.PORTFOLIO>5</PRIVATE.PORTFOLIO>
<PRIVATE.OFFER>
<PRIVATE.BID>
<PRIVATE.PRICE>155</PRIVATE.PRICE>
<PRIVATE.QUANTITY>15</PRIVATE.QUANTITY>
<PRIVATE.EXPIRATION_TIME>982569800</PRIVATE.EXPIRATION_TIME>
<PRIVATE.CREATION_TIME>962640181</PRIVATE.CREATION_TIME>
</PRIVATE.BID>
<PRIVATE.BID>
<PRIVATE.PRICE>135</PRIVATE.PRICE>
<PRIVATE.QUANTITY>23</PRIVATE.QUANTITY>
<PRIVATE.EXPIRATION_TIME>982569800</PRIVATE.EXPIRATION_TIME>
<PRIVATE.CREATION_TIME>962640185</PRIVATE.CREATION_TIME>
</PRIVATE.BID>
<PRIVATE.BID>
<PRIVATE.PRICE>75</PRIVATE.PRICE>
<PRIVATE.QUANTITY>15</PRIVATE.QUANTITY>
<PRIVATE.EXPIRATION_TIME>982569800</PRIVATE.EXPIRATION_TIME>
<PRIVATE.CREATION_TIME>962640061</PRIVATE.CREATION_TIME>
</PRIVATE.BID>
</PRIVATE.OFFER> [...code follows...]
</PRIVATE.OFFER>
</PRIVATE.STOCK>
</PRIVATE>
</MARKET>
Figure 3: XML interface definition for the private and public information
7Based on the information contained in the XML-file the agent applies its strategy to the data
in step (3), which is outlined in more detail in the next section. In step (4) the agent has the
option to initiate three valid market transactions:
posting bids and asks on the market:
http://market.wiwi.hu-
berlin.de:7000/xml/trade.xml?notationID=0&marketID=0&transaction=b&price=10&q
uantity=5&expiration_time=&username=myusername&password=mypassword
deleting its own bids or asks on the market:
http://market.wiwi.hu-
berlin.de:7000/xml/delete.xml?notationID=0&marketID=0&transaction=b&price=10&
quantity=5&expiration_time=&username=myusername&password=mypassword
buying bundles form or sell bundles to the bank:
http://market.wiwi.hu-
berlin.de:7000/xml/bundle.xml?marketID=0&transaction=b&quantity&username=myus
ername&password=mypassword
In step (5) the market responds with an XML-file regarding the status of the transaction (Fig.
4). Now the agents continue with step (1) in order to get new market information.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<RESULT>
<CODE>0</CODE>
<MESSAGETEXT>
The market is closed!
</MESSAGETEXT>
</RESULT>
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<RESULT>
<CODE>1</CODE>
<MESSAGETEXT>
Transaction successful! Bought 4
bundles from the bank!
</MESSAGETEXT>
</RESULT>
Figure 4: XML interface definition for the three market transactions: market was closed (left), and market was
operating (right).
3. Agents and strategies
Considering the game theoretical point of view we can define strategy as a player’s complete
plan of action for all possible occurrences in the game. From the computer science point of
view, strategy is the execution of a fixed algorithm. The two definitions are, of course, not
mutually exclusive and indeed we need both of them.2 However, because we will describe the
actions of the agents we have implemented, we will stick to the latter interpretation of the
strategies. We have chosen the sample of strategies on behalf of basic and pure strategies
which have been observed in artificial stock markets with human traders. This compilation
may not be complete nor is it designed to find out a successful strategy. Here we first describe
the general idea behind each strategy, then the reason for which we have created such a
strategy (the “real world analogy”) and finally we describe, in words, the algorithm (the
                                                
2 Different would be the case of a market that does not use software agents. In this case the game
theoretical interpretation would be sufficient
8instance). The agents and their strategies have been implemented as a stand-alone Java-client
(JavaSoft 1997), that can be used on any standard personal computer.3
3.1 The fundamentalist (patriot style)
Strategy description: A “fundamental strategy” is one in which a trader buys a share and waits
for the final event to happen, trusting his/her analysis of the fundamental data regarding the
entity (company, soccer team, etc.) whose share is bought.
Real world analogy: Fundamentalist actions are quite common among traders in real world
markets. Traders, for example, buy shares relying on financial information regarding the firm
(fundamental data) and keep them regardless of short-run price fluctuations of the shares: the
fundamentalist strategy may be seen as a sort of patriotic behavior, in which the trader buys
the shares of his home team.
Instances: We implemented one fundamentalist agent. It basically concentrates its efforts only
on one entity and buys the shares only of that entity. For simplification this agents posts only
bids: the price at which the shares are bought is the last paid price on the market or, if
possibly, lower.
3.2 The follower
Strategy description: A “follower strategy” is one in which a trader echoes the actions of the
other subjects of the market based on a pre-defined signal. In our case, the agent reacts to the
price of a share (the signal), buying when the price of the share is high or low. The underlying
assumption is that the price of a share is a signal regarding the quality of the entity (e.g. a
firm): if the share’s price is high, this means that many traders are asking for this share and
therefore we may presume that the share is very valuable. On the other hand, if the price of
the share is very low, we may come to the conclusion that the entity whose share is traded is
not very valuable.
Real world analogy: Follower actions are quite common. Many traders rely only on the trend
of the price of the share, sometimes acting as if the share had its own life and did not relate to
a real world entity. Chart analysis, analysis based on historical data of the share’s price, is
nowadays a “science” to which many traders relate.
Instances: We implemented two follower agents:
1. The follower high buys the share with the highest price and does it as long as there is
enough money. To put it differently, this strategy prompts to follow the mass: if the
expectations about the final value of the share are high, everyone will be willing to buy
the share. Thus, its price will be very high. This agent “adapts” its expectations to the
others.
2. The follower low buys the share with the lowest price and does it as long as there is
enough money. It is basically the opposite of the first one. The trader buys the shares
which are discarded by all other traders. The price of the share, again, reflects the
expectation about the final value of the share: the entity whose share is bought is thought
of being a sure looser. With a high probability the trader is going to incur a loss.
Nevertheless, if , at the final event, the shares bought are the winning ones, the agents will
gain considerably.
                                                
3 The source code is available at http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/~jensg/etrade. The following
requirements are needed in order to run the agents: JDK 1.1.8 or later (including the Java 2 SDK),
JAXP - JAVA API for XML Parsing, http://java.sun.com/xml.
93.3 The stochastic
Strategy description: A “stochastic strategy” is one in which a trader buys shares at a random
price. In our case the agent does not choose a completely random price in the set of all
possible numbers, rather a price which floats in a fixed range or in a range around a given
value. We have implemented two kind of variations, one that uses the market rule information
and one that uses the public market information to calculate the given value.
Real world analogy: Stochastic actions are difficult to be proven in a real stock market: even
if we could find a trader who candidly admitted that he/she traded without knowing what
he/she was doing, there is always a rationale behind a trading action. Nevertheless traders
have different degrees of information, and traders who dispose of more information may
appear to act irrationally in the market to the eyes of poorly informed traders. A typical
example may be the action of an “inside trader” that handles shares in a rational manner, but
my appear “stochastic” to the eyes of non informed traders.
Instances: We planned four stochastic agents. All of them continuously and randomly chose
the shares they bought and sold.
1. The stochastic generates its stochastic price bid/ask based on the following formula: “the
stochastic price is an equally distributed value which lies between 0 and 1.5*bundle-
price/number of shares”
2. The static stochastic generates its stochastic price bid/ask based on a fixed predetermined
parameter, so the prices of its orders will be randomly distributed around a given value.
The formula states “the stochastic price lies in the range of ± 100*RV around a given
value”, where the random value (RV) is normally distributed between –1 and +1.
3. The dynamic stochastic generates its stochastic price bids/asks based on a constantly
changing parameter, the last price on the market. The formula states: “the stochastic price
lies in the range of ± 100*RV around the last paid price”, where RV is a normally
distributed random value between –1 and +1. If we may say so, the dynamic stochastic
agent has a higher degree of adaptation to the sub events of the market than the static
stochastic.
4. The demand function stochastic builds its strategy on the dynamic stochastic agent, but
adds a peculiarity: it follows the price of a share and modulates the quantity accordingly.
Formally speaking, the agent has a fixed value for the price of a share (threshold  value)
under which it buys the share with increasing quantities as the price of the share declines,
and over which it sells the share with increasing quantities as the price increases. In more
simple words: (when acting as a seller) the more the share is in demand, the higher is the
price and the more this agent sells that share; on the other hand (when acting as a buyer)
the more the share is sold, the lower is the price and the more this agent buys of that share.
It basically follows the demand or the offer curve.
3.4  The arbitrageur
Strategy description: An “arbitrageur strategy” tries to earn a profit without taking a risk. This
is implemented by buying a standardized portfolio from the market and selling it back to the
bank or the other way around. Differently stated, the agent exploits the difference between
market price and bank price for the same bundle. This will lead to sure profit when the agent
can perform the complete set of transactions.
Real world analogy This is a more elegant strategy and probably the one which bears the
greatest resemblance  to real trade strategies. Arbitrage trading happens daily in the markets.
These actions may be performed by expert traders who can simultaneously follow different
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markets, but, since these actions are quite tedious and need constant attention, they are
generally performed by software agents.
Instances: For the arbitrageur strategy we planned one agent. The agent considers the shares
which form the bundle X, the bundle that the bank is always ready to buy and sell at any time
at a fixed price. Then it looks for the outstanding bids/asks of the single shares forming the
bundle. If the overall ask of the bundle is lower than the bank price the agent will buy the
bundle from the market and afterwards resell it to the bank. On the contrary, if the best buy
offers (bid) on the market sum up to a higher bundle price than the price of the bank the agent
will buy the bundle from the bank and resell it to the market.
3.5 The speculator
Strategy description: This agent applies a similar strategy to the arbitrageur, though with a
small but relevant difference: it does not aim for a sure win by exploiting the difference
between market price and bank price, rather it “raids on the wave of speculation”, pushing the
willingness to pay of the other traders. To put it differently, it gives them the shares they want
gambling on the fact that in a situation of collective excitement, traders will be ready to pay a
little bit more in order to possess the “hot” share.
Real world analogy: Speculative bubbles may be our best examples. People - both experts and
non experts - buy shares because of “voices” or because in recent times the share’s value has
risen tremendously (possibly because others before bought them based on the same
reasoning). The speculator hopes to make money not from the “dividend” of the share, but
from the difference between buying price and selling price, trusting that the price of the share
will continue to rise even more after the share was bought.
Instances We planned one speculator agent. It looks at the market price of the shares or,
better said, of the bundle of shares: if the market price of the bundle is overvalued, that is, if
the sum of the ask is greater than the bundle price at the bank , the agent buys the bundle from
the bank and tries to resell it to the market at the overvalued price plus a mark-up. The
formula states: “buy stock form the bank and resell it in the market at the last-price + RV*
given value”, where the random value (RV) is between 0 and +1 the right half of a normal
distribution. The “given value” is a parameter which gives the higher cap on the mark-up or,
in other words, how much more the agent may ask at maximum.
4. Experimental results
To test the market-agent interface, we conducted a simple experiment where the market
design was taken from the previously running Euro2000 market: traders could buy and sell
shares of 16 countries participating in the European soccer championships with a payoff of
1.000 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) for the European Champion and a payoff of 0 ECU
for all other 15 teams. The agent experiment used the same rules, yet there were some
changes: the a priori probability for each share being the winner was 1/16, the market opened
only for one hour, and during that time only market information was available to the agents.
Each of the 11 agents started with an initial endowment of 500.000 ECU and without any
shares. The exact parameters of the agents’ strategies are described in Table 1. To give all
agents an equal opportunity to trade on the market each instance of an agent was started on
the same computer consuming the same amount of CPU time and memory.
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# Agent Parameter Value Market transactions Market-adaptive
ID of share 0
limit price 250
ID of share 5
limit price 200
3 Follower High limit price 500 market bid yes
4 Follower Low market bid yes
5 Pure stochastic bank buy/sell, market bid/ask no
6 Static stochastic (1) mean price 65 bank buy/sell, market bid/ask no
7 Static stochastic (2) mean price 60 bank buy/sell, market bid/ask no
8 Dynamic stochastic bank buy/sell, market bid/ask yes
9 Demand function stochastic bank buy/sell, market bid/ask yes
10 Arbitrageur bank buy/sell, market bid/ask yes
11 Speculator max. surplus 30 bank buy, market ask yes
yes
yes
1
2
Fundamentalist (1) market bid
Fundamentalist (2) market bid
Table 1: Agents and parameter values
The agents can be described as stable, i.e. all agents traded until the end of the session,
independent, i.e. all of them could start and stop independently from others, interface-human-
like, i.e. all agents used the same information that the market provides to human traders, and
market-adaptive, i.e. the majority (ruling out, for example, the static stochastic agent) made
their transaction based on market information. During a one hour trading period the average
trading volume was 2,4 Mio ECU and there was about one market transaction, where buy and
sell offers were matched, every second.
During a market run, the first traders are the non-adaptive agents: these are the one which start
posting offers and trade with each other. At the point where the market is over-/undervalued
the arbitrageur starts trading. When prices for all shares develop all other market-adaptive
agents start to act. A very active trader in selling shares is the speculator, whereas the
follower low is the most active in buying shares. Yet the overall most active traders are the
stochastic agents, which are doing both, buying and selling on the market. A more
background-like strategy can be observed for the fundamentalists, which try to buy their
specific share at a reasonable price.
# Agent
No of market 
transactions: 
buy
No of market 
transactions: 
sell
First trade after 
X market 
transactions
No of different 
shares in 
portfolio Yield
1 Fundamentalist (1) 209 0 129 1 -40,9%
2 Fundamentalist (2) 161 0 88 1 -36,9%
3 Follower High 197 0 107 5,3 -45,1%
4 Follower Low 622 0 425 13 37,2%
5 Pure stochastic 570 961 8 15 11,6%
6 Static stochastic (1) 601 452 21 16 34,6%
7 Static stochastic (2) 567 474 6 15,6 30,9%
8 Dynamic stochastic 222 151 34 16 9,3%
9 Demand function stochastic 191 141 32 16 10,2%
10 Arbitrageur 40 236 18 14,6 2,2%
11 Speculator 0 965 279 16 -13,1%
Table 2: Descriptive agent results, values are the average of 3 market runs.
The time series of the market prices of the 16 shares can be divided in two categories. The
shares the fundamentalist strategies are buying (0 and 5) on the one hand, and the rest of the
shares on the other hand. The private information of the fundamentalist, to buy share 0 up to
until 250 ECU and share 5 up to until 200 ECU, results in a concave rise of these share prices,
yet the full information is not revealed (Figure 5, top left). The public information, that all
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shares have a winning probability of 1/16, is revealed in the market by similar prices for the
rest of the shares. These shares do not seem to follow a pattern, which may give a hint on a
random walk (Figure 5, top right). When we look at information efficiency, Fama (1970)
distinguishes between markets with fully revealed private information and not revealed
private information. Our market experiment revealed the private information partly, which
goes in accordance with empirical market data.
To our surprise the arbitrageur only yielded a tiny win on average and even lost money on
occasions. It turned out that the agent could often not complete the whole set of trades to
employ its arbitrage strategy. This is due to the market mechanism, which does not allow for
atomic transaction for a set of trades in order to gain arbitrage. In the case of the arbitrageur
the result was an unbalanced portfolio, which is equal to engaging in a risk. The strategy may
be improved by re-balancing the portfolio.
Given the set of implemented agents and the WTA market rule, the most successful strategy is
the follower low, who attempts to buy a portfolio of low priced shares. This agent starts his
first market transaction late, waiting for the other agents to generate prices. At this point the
strategy is very effective in conducting market transactions that implement the successful
portfolio (see Table 2). Similar to the most successful strategy described by Rust et. al (1994)
the agent can be described as “sit in the background”. Yet the follower low would not be
successful, when the fundamentalist is buying the winning share, driving the prices of the
share up. Runner up is the static stochastic strategy, which also manages to get a diversified
portfolio by posting rather constant prices on every share. Not successful have been the
specializing fundamentalists, who attempt to buy an extremely unbalanced portfolio. These
strategies lost all their invested money in picking up a share that did not pay off.
5. Related work
Much work has been done about automated agents in the context of electronic commerce. A
good starting point on agent mediated electronic commerce can be found in Guttmann et al.
(1998). In the following, we will focus on related work that is concerned about automated
negotiation. In particular we will review market based approaches, which provide a market
institution and a set of rules to do the negotiation. In our context agents negotiate in a
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Figure 5: Sample time series of traded prices of share 5 (top left) with the corresponding trade volumes
(bottom left) and share 4 (top right and bottom right).
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competitive environment, yet there are other approaches in the AI community, such as
collaborative agents, that will not be reviewed here.
In the experimental economics community work on strategies has often been done by
conducting tournaments (Abreu and Rubinstein 1988, Selten et al. 1997). Rust et al. (1993,
1994) report on the Santa Fe’s tournament, where researchers where invited to submit
software agents that compete on a CDA market against one another. The focus here was to
find successful trading strategies out of the submitted set of agents. The most successful
strategy in this tournament can be described as rather parasitic: sitting in the background and
exploiting the strategies of other traders. In addition, they report about an evolutionary
tournament, where the percentage of traders was adjusted in accordance to the success of a
strategy over time. Parallel to the tournament there has been a discussion on the lower bound
of traders’ intelligence to act similarly to human traders in a market institution (Gode and
Sunder 1993a&b, Cliff and Bruton 1998). A recent overview on agent-based computational
finance can be found in LeBaron (2000).
Applications for  multi-agent systems using the CDA mechanism have been developed by the
XeroX Palo Alto Research Center (Parc). This includes a system for controlling building
environments, where cool air is auctioned in the Parc building (Clearwater and Huberman
1994, Huberman and Clearwater 1995). In this application thermostat-agents buy and sell cool
air with the help of a central auctioneering process. Other applications include computational
resource allocation (Huberman and Hogg 1995).
The caveat of CDA systems is that they will only be useful for spot markets, where
homogenous goods can be described with a single price. Systems that handle goods with multi
dimensional properties include Kasbah developed by MIT, a system where users can create
autonomous agents that buy and sell goods on their behalf (Chavez and Maes 1996,  Chavez
et al. 1997). This system uses a classified ad metaphor, where agents post their offers to the
common blackboard and agents rely on one-to-one bargaining. A market based approach is
the Michigan AuctionBot where human and artificial agents can engage in online auctions via
Internet (Wurman et al.1998). Other systems include the fishmarket project (Collins et al.
1998) and MAGNA, an integrated approach to an agent-based virtual market that should
include all steps of a commercial interaction (Tsvetovatyy et al. 1997).
An introductory text for using economic principles in automated negotiation can be found in
Binmore and Vulkan (1999). Varian (1995) gives an introduction to economic mechanism
design for computerized agents.
6. Conclusions and Outlook
We have extended an artificial stock market for human traders with an automated agent
interface. The use of a market institution results in a simple negotiation protocol that was
implemented by using eXtensible Markup Language (XML). In our first experiment we used
a set of agents, that implemented pure and simple strategies on the ground of market rules and
market information. These agents, some of which show random, others  market adaptive
behavior, can simulate human-like trading performance in the existence of a market
institution.
Further work should compare strategies in different payoff regimes that impose different
degrees of risk, e.g. vote share markets compared to winner takes it all markets. The analysis
of the strategies should include a larger set of agents, that might be collected in a tournament,
where traders might send in their own strategies. In addition, the stability of successful
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strategies can be tested in an evolutionary experiment, where the population of strategies
converges towards the more successful strategies. So far the automated agents only trade on
behalf of rule and market information. An extension could be to allow for an additional news
source, that provides changing information about the stocks.
The ultimate goal for further experiments is to inductively observe how agents change the
strategies of human subjects operating in the electronic market. Now, the market-agent
interface gives us the ability to explore this question in a laboratory environment, where
human and artificial agents can participate alike.
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